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Unconscious priming is a prototypical example of an automatic process, which is
initiated without deliberate intention. Classical theories of automaticity assume that such
unconscious automatic processes occur in a purely bottom-up driven fashion independent
of executive control mechanisms. In contrast to these classical theories, our attentional
sensitization model of unconscious information processing proposes that unconscious
processing is susceptible to executive control and is only elicited if the cognitive system is
configured accordingly. It is assumed that unconscious processing depends on attentional
amplification of task-congruent processing pathways as a function of task sets. This
article provides an overview of the latest research on executive control influences
on unconscious information processing. I introduce refined theories of automaticity
with a particular focus on the attentional sensitization model of unconscious cognition
which is specifically developed to account for various attentional influences on different
types of unconscious information processing. In support of the attentional sensitization
model, empirical evidence is reviewed demonstrating executive control influences on
unconscious cognition in the domains of visuo-motor and semantic processing: subliminal
priming depends on attentional resources, is susceptible to stimulus expectations and
is influenced by action intentions and task sets. This suggests that even unconscious
processing is flexible and context-dependent as a function of higher-level executive
control settings. I discuss that the assumption of attentional sensitization of unconscious
information processing can accommodate conflicting findings regarding the automaticity
of processes in many areas of cognition and emotion. This theoretical view has the
potential to stimulate future research on executive control of unconscious processing in
healthy and clinical populations.
Keywords: unconscious information processing, automatic processes, attentional control, visuo-motor priming,
semantic priming, emotional priming, subliminal perception
INTRODUCTION
Unconscious processes are prototypical examples of automatic
processes, which are initiated without deliberate intention
(Posner and Snyder, 1975). An important method to measure
unconscious processes are subliminal priming (e.g., facilitatory)
effects on subsequent decisions or actions on visible targets,
which are elicited by masked visual stimuli that are not con-
sciously perceived (Greenwald et al., 1996; Vorberg et al., 2003;
Kiefer, 2007). Typically, a pattern or metacontrast mask is pre-
sented after—or in the case of pattern masking also before
the prime—to prevent its conscious perception (Breitmeyer and
Ög˘men, 2006). Although these stimuli cannot be consciously per-
ceived, there are meanwhile numerous demonstrations that they
trigger cognitive processes at several levels of complexity and thus
can influence decisions and actions (for reviews see, Dehaene
et al., 2006; Kiefer et al., 2011; Schmidt et al., 2011; Ansorge et al.,
2011b; Kunde et al., 2012).
According to classical theories of cognitive control and auto-
maticity (Posner and Snyder, 1975; Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977),
such unconscious processes are automatic in the sense that
they occur in a purely bottom-up driven fashion independent
of attentional control mechanisms. Attentional executive con-
trol mechanisms that organize action and thought (Norman
and Shallice, 1986; Posner and DiGirolamo, 1998) according to
higher-level goals are assumed to be exclusive to the domain of
conscious cognition. Classical theories of cognitive control, there-
fore, propose that only conscious processes depend on capacity-
limited attentional resources and can be modulated by executive
control. This alleged association of executive control and atten-
tion with the domain of conscious cognition has been recently
challenged in two respects: (1) Unconscious stimuli influence
executive control settings. Several experiments showed that sub-
liminal stimuli can modulate shifts of spatial (Ansorge et al.,
2002; Scharlau and Ansorge, 2003) and modality-specific atten-
tion (Mattler, 2003, 2005) as well as task-specific control oper-
ations (Mattler, 2003, 2005, 2006) and task sets (Reuss et al.,
2011; Wokke et al., 2011). (2) Furthermore, the relation between
executive control and unconscious processing is bidirectional
because top-down factors such as attentional resources, stimu-
lus expectations, action intensions, or task sets, all factors that
are typically considered to involve executive control mechanisms
(Norman and Shallice, 1986), modulate unconscious stimulus
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processing (Jas´kowski et al., 2003; Ansorge and Neumann, 2005;
Kiefer and Martens, 2010; Wokke et al., 2011). Hence, these
two lines of research suggest that executive control mechanisms
interact with unconscious information processing in several ways
and are thus not exclusive to the domain of conscious cognition
(Kiefer et al., 2011).
This article provides an overview of the latest research on
executive control influences on unconscious information process-
ing. I introduce refined theories of automaticity with a particular
focus on the attentional sensitization model of unconscious cog-
nition (Kiefer and Martens, 2010) which is specifically developed
to account for various executive control influences on differ-
ent types of unconscious information processing. In support
of these refined theories of automaticity, empirical evidence is
presented demonstrating attentional influences on unconscious
cognition in the domains of visuo-motor and semantic process-
ing. This suggests that even unconscious processing is flexible and
context-dependent as a function of executive control settings.
CLASSICAL VERSUS REFINED THEORIES OF AUTOMATICITY
The classical view of executive control and automaticity is still
influential and pervades current theorizing about automaticity
and cognitive control. The core assumption of this view that
executive control is exclusive to the domain of conscious cog-
nition while unconscious automatic processes are autonomous
(Posner and Snyder, 1975; Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977) implies
that a behavioral or neurophysiological effect has to be context-
independent in order to index a “truly automatic” process
(Pessoa et al., 2003). Such operational definitions of auto-
maticity, which are essentially influenced by the classical view,
can be found in many areas of psychology and neuroscience
such as object or face recognition (e.g., Pessoa et al., 2002;
e.g., Wiese et al., 2008), action preparation (e.g., Bub and
Masson, 2010), and emotional processing (e.g., Pessoa et al.,
2002). However, it is difficult to identify processes that actu-
ally meet the classical criteria for automaticity because task
demands frequently modulate behavioral and neurophysiologi-
cal effects (see also, Moors and De Houwer, 2006). As almost
all kind of cognitive activity has to be classified as “controlled”
according to classical criteria, the distinction between strate-
gic and automatic processing becomes practically superfluous.
This renders the classical view of automaticity unsatisfactory.
Furthermore, if unconscious automatic processing were context-
independent, this would result in a tremendous inflexibility
of the cognitive system (Kiefer and Martens, 2010): conscious
goal-directed information processing would be massively influ-
enced by various unconscious processes. Demands on conscious
executive control would be increased, because the intended
action could only be ensured by inhibiting numerous interfer-
ing response tendencies induced by unconscious information
processing (Botvinick et al., 2001).
Refined theories of automaticity and unconscious processing
allow for more flexibility and adaptability of unconscious auto-
matic processing (Neumann, 1990; Naccache et al., 2002; Moors
and De Houwer, 2006; Kiefer, 2007; Kiefer and Martens, 2010).
These theories posit that unconscious or automatic processing
in general depends on a configuration of the cognitive system
by attention and task sets. Neumann (1990) proposes in his
theory of direct parameter specification (DPS) that unconscious
information will only be processed and will influence the motor
response to a target stimulus to the extent that it matches current
intentions. Similarly, the global workspace model of conscious-
ness by Dehaene and Naccache (2001) explicitly assumes that
unconscious processes are susceptible to attentional amplifica-
tion. Unlike classical theories, refined theories propose that exec-
utive control factors such as attention, intentions, and task sets
orchestrate the unconscious processing streams toward greater
optimization of task performance. Given this dependency on the
precise configuration of the cognitive system, the term “con-
ditional automaticity” has been coined (Bargh, 1989; Logan,
1989).
THE ATTENTIONAL SENSITIZATION MODEL OF
UNCONSCIOUS COGNITION
Although previous refined theories of automaticity agree that
automatic processes are susceptible to top-down control, they
do not account for a number of executive control factors and
different forms of automatic processes. The attentional sensitiza-
tion model of unconscious cognition (Kiefer and Martens, 2010)
was developed within this line of research, but aims at explain-
ing the various influences of executive control factors on different
forms of unconscious automatic processing. It is proposed that
attentional influences originating from task sets enhance task-
relevant unconscious processes while attenuating task-irrelevant
unconscious processes. Task sets are defined as an adaptive con-
figuration of the cognitive system which is necessary to efficiently
perform a given task (Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Kiesel et al.,
2010). The concept of “task set” refers to the immediate compu-
tational consequences of pursuing a current goal during task per-
formance that are implemented by executive control mechanisms
(Kiesel et al., 2010).
Much as conscious perception is influenced by attentional
mechanisms, unconscious cognition is thought to be controlled
by top-down signals from prefrontal cortex (Haynes et al., 2007)
that increase or decrease the sensitivity of processing pathways for
incoming sensory input (Hopfinger et al., 2000, 2001; Bode and
Haynes, 2008). Processing in task-relevant pathways is enhanced
by increasing the gain of the neurons in the corresponding areas,
whereas processing in task-irrelevant pathways is attenuated by
a decrease of the gain (Reynolds et al., 2000). Gain is a parame-
ter in neural network modeling, which influences the probability
that a neuron fires at a given activation level (Hamker, 2005).
Single cell recordings in non-human primates have shown that
the likelihood of a neuron firing, given a constant sensory input,
is enhanced when the stimulus dimension that is preferentially
processed by the neuron is attended to (e.g., Treue and Martínez
Trujillo, 1999). Hence, the attentional sensitizing mechanism is
thought to gradually enhance and attenuate stimulus processing
irrespective of whether the stimulus is consciously perceived or
not (Kiefer and Martens, 2010).
Two basic predictions can be derived from the attentional
sensitization model: in a manner similar to conscious strategic
processes, unconscious automatic processes (1) should depend
on available attentional resources, and (2) should be susceptible
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to executive control by currently active task representations.
Attentional sensitization of unconscious processing by task repre-
sentations is achieved by enhancing the sensitivity of task-relevant
pathways and by attenuating the sensitivity of task-irrelevant
pathways.
Although executive control of both unconscious and conscious
processing shares basic computational principles, control of con-
scious strategic processing is more flexible in several respects.
Preemptive control, in which top-down influences are initiated
in advance of stimulus presentation, can be exerted for both
conscious and unconscious stimulus presentation, whereas only
consciously perceived stimuli are susceptible to reactive con-
trol in response to ongoing or completed stimulus processing
(Ansorge andHorstmann, 2007; Kiefer, 2007; Ansorge et al., 2009,
2011a; Kiefer and Martens, 2010). For that reason, subliminal
information cannot be used for determining further strategic pro-
cessing steps in a deliberate or intentional fashion (Merikle et al.,
1995). Executive control of unconscious information processing
cannot be exerted intentionally in anticipation or response to
subliminal stimuli themselves because individuals are not aware
of them by definition. Executive control in the unconscious
domain must occur indirectly on the grounds of other repre-
sentations, whether conscious or unconscious: executive control
can be based on a currently active conscious action goal that
is internally generated by the individual or externally induced
by task instructions (Ansorge and Neumann, 2005). Executive
control can also be based on the consciously perceived outcome
of overt behavior, which leads to an adjustment of control set-
tings (Jas´kowski et al., 2003). These conscious goal or outcome
representations establish or modify task sets that in turn reg-
ulate the sensitivity of processing pathways for both conscious
and unconscious information. As mentioned at the beginning of
this article, control settings are not only intentionally created in
a conscious mode, but can also be unconsciously triggered by
subliminal stimuli such as attentional or task cues (e.g., Ansorge
et al., 2002; Mattler, 2005; Reuss et al., 2011). However, as
executive control in the unconscious domain is preemptive, sub-
liminal stimuli that trigger or modify cognitive control settings
must be presented before the unconscious process of interest is
elicited (e.g., by a subliminal prime). According to the atten-
tional sensitization model, intentional application of control and
on-line modification is restricted to conscious strategic pro-
cesses (see also Dehaene et al., 2006). Finally, executive control
of unconscious processing is presumably based on facilitatory
influences, that is, it depends on differential attentional sensiti-
zation, whereas active inhibition of task-irrelevant information
appears to be confined to controlled processing of consciously
perceived stimuli (Posner and Snyder, 1975; Neely, 1977; Merikle
et al., 1995). Thus, according to the attentional sensitization
model conscious stimulus processing, which is traditionally con-
sidered to be “strategic,” allows for a greater adaptability and
flexibility of executive control than unconscious automatic infor-
mation processing (for a discussion see, Kiefer and Martens,
2010). One can, therefore, distinguish even within the light of
refined theories of automaticity strategic and automatic processes
although the defining criteria differ from classical theories in
several aspects.
EXECUTIVE CONTROL INFLUENCES ON UNCONSCIOUS
INFORMATION PROCESSING
In the upcoming parts of this article, I will review latest evi-
dence demonstrating executive control influences on unconscious
visuo-motor and semantic information processing in support of
the attentional sensitization model of unconscious cognition.
UNCONSCIOUS VISUO-MOTOR PROCESSING
Unconscious visuo-motor processing is typically investigated
with the masked visuo-motor response priming paradigm (sub-
liminal visuo-motor priming): responses to visual targets are
faster, when the masked prime (also a visual stimulus) indi-
cates the same (congruent) rather than a different (incongru-
ent) response (Neumann and Klotz, 1994; Dehaene et al., 1998;
Vorberg et al., 2003; Ansorge and Neumann, 2005). In this
paradigm, a visual shape is frequently arbitrarily assigned with
a motor response (Schmidt et al., 2011). This form of prim-
ing depends on visuo-motor processes that give rise to response
conflict in the incongruent condition. In line with this interpre-
tation, visuo-motor response priming modulates ERPs over the
occipito-parietal scalp in a time window between 200 and 400ms
(Jas´kowski et al., 2003; Martens et al., 2011). These ERPs most
likely arise from the parietal visuo-motor system as identified in
a previous functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study
(Wolbers et al., 2006).
In line with the proposed notion of executive control over
unconscious processing, subliminal visuo-motor priming effects
were shown to be influenced by action intentions and stimulus
expectations. The influence of action intentions has been inten-
sively studies by Ansorge and colleagues (e.g., Ansorge et al., 2002,
2010; Ansorge and Neumann, 2005). They found that uncon-
sciously perceived masked primes trigger responses only if they
are congruent with the current intentions of a person. Visuo-
motor priming effects were abolished when task instructions were
changed in such a way that primes ceased to be task-relevant. For
instance, primes and targets with a similar shape elicited sublim-
inal response priming effects only when the response decision
was based on the target’s shape (Ansorge and Neumann, 2005).
However, when the instruction of the target task was changed
such that the response decision was based on the target’s color,
response priming effects disappeared although primes and tar-
gets still exhibited similar or dissimilar shapes (Ansorge and
Neumann, 2005). In a comparable experiment, shape or color
congruency of masked primes and visible targets only primed tar-
get responses, when the corresponding prime feature (e.g., shape
feature during shape decisions on the target) was relevant in the
target task (Tapia et al., 2010). The task-irrelevant prime feature
did not influence responses to targets (see also, Wokke et al.,
2011). Similarly, spatial congruency of prime and target words
indicating either an elevated (e.g., “above”) or a lowered location
(e.g., “below”) produced priming effects only during a spatial tar-
get task, but not during a target task with numbers of high and
low numerical magnitude (Ansorge et al., 2010). These findings
suggest that action intentions sensitize congruent and desensitize
incongruent unconscious processing pathways: it is proposed that
an attentional top-down signal enhances unconscious process-
ing of the stimulus dimension that matches the current intention
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(Kiefer and Martens, 2010). Attentional sensitization results in
subliminal priming effects on responses to visible targets only for
stimulus dimensions that are congruent with the current action
intention.
In addition to action intentions, unconscious visuo-motor
processing has been shown to depend on stimulus expectations.
Stimulus expectations establish an attentional set, which indicates
what kind of stimuli are likely to occur within a given situation.
Expected subliminal stimuli receive attentional amplification and
are more efficiently processed whereas processing of unexpected
stimuli is attenuated. It should be noted that expectations can-
not be established by unconsciously presented stimuli themselves,
but must be formed by consciously perceived stimuli presented
within a given context, for instance by the visible target stim-
uli of a priming paradigm. It has been shown that the type of
visible target stimuli included in an experiment strongly influ-
ences subliminal priming effects: masked stimuli prime responses
only if they are expected and represent possible release condi-
tions for prepared actions to the visible targets (Kunde et al.,
2003; Eckstein and Perrig, 2007; Kiesel et al., 2009). Subliminal
visuo-motor priming effects elicited by novel primes, which are
not presented as targets, are only obtained when they belong to
or are at least similar to the attentional set established by the vis-
ible targets: for instance, subliminally presented novel numbers
prime numerical categorizations of visible numbers only when
they are located within the magnitude space spanned by the vis-
ible targets (e.g., the prime numbers “2” and “3” are within the
magnitude space spanned by the visible targets “1” and “4”),
but not when they are outside the magnitude space spanned by
the visible targets (e.g., the prime numbers “1” and “2” are out-
side the magnitude space spanned by the visible targets “3” and
“4”). Expectancy effects on unconscious visuo-motor priming
were also obtained for novel verbal stimuli within a semantic cat-
egorization task when the target set size was manipulated (Kiesel
et al., 2006). When target set size was large (40 targets) so that a
variety of words from different semantic categories was expected,
novel word primes elicited visuo-motor priming effects. However,
when target set size was small (four targets) so that attention
could be focused on a narrow set of stimuli, novel word primes
did not produce subliminal priming. These findings demonstrate
that stimulus expectations establish an attentional set that sen-
sitizes the corresponding visuo-motor processing pathways for
unconscious stimuli. As a result, only expected subliminal stimuli
elicit priming effects.
Unconscious visuo-motor processing does not only depend on
specific stimulus expectations, but is also influenced by focusing
attention in time: subliminal visuo-motor priming in a numerical
judgment task was only obtained when the onset of the prime-
target pairs was temporally predictable and therefore, attended to
(Naccache et al., 2002). Hence, not only the content of the atten-
tional set (specific stimulus expectations), but also the temporal
dynamics of attention plays an important role in executive control
of unconscious visuo-motor processes.
The mechanisms underlying attentional influences on uncon-
scious visuo-motor processing were further specified in a study
using the induction task paradigm (Martens et al., 2011). The
induction task paradigm was recently developed (Kiefer and
Martens, 2010) to specifically test the predictions of the atten-
tional sensitization model (see Figure 1A). It allows directly
investigating the influence of activated task sets on unconscious
information processing, irrespective of action intentions to visi-
ble targets or global stimulus expectations. In this paradigm, two
different tasks are performed in quick succession: the subliminal
priming task is preceded by different classification tasks serv-
ing to activate specific task sets. As task sets are active for about
600ms after task completion (Rogers and Monsell, 1995), they
should influence processing of subsequently presented subliminal
primes.
In our study (Martens et al., 2011), the subliminal visuo-
motor priming task required participants to perform right or
left-hand responses to discriminate between geometrical target
shapes (e.g., circle or square). The visible target was preceded
by a masked prime that either indicated the same or a different
motor response, but was never combined with the identical shape
to avoid repetition effects. Prior to this subliminal visuo-motor
priming task, participants were engaged in a perceptual classifi-
cation (round vs. elongated object) or in a semantic classification
task (living vs. non-living object) designed to induce a specific
task set (e.g., a perceptual or semantic task set). These induction
tasks were followed immediately by the priming task. According
to the proposed attentional sensitization model, visuo-motor
priming should benefit from a previous sensitization of visual
pathways by the perceptual induction task compared with the
semantic induction task. In line with these predictions, behavioral
and electrophysiological effects showed a differential modulation
of subliminal visuo-motor priming by the induction tasks: visuo-
motor priming, depending on access to visual shape information,
was only observed after the perceptual but not after the semantic
induction task (see Figure 1B).
In a continuation of this line of research, the induction task
paradigm was used for a fine-grained analysis of task set influ-
ences on unconscious visuo-motor response priming. There is
evidence that shape and color of visible objects can be attended
to and processed independently of each other (Boucart et al.,
1995). Based on these findings, the induction task was varied
within the perceptual domain to further assess whether the pro-
posed attentional sensitization mechanism not only distinguishes
between broad cognitive domains such as visual vs. seman-
tic stimulus attributes but also specifically sensitizes stimulus
attributes within the perceptual domain (Zovko and Kiefer, sub-
mitted). The effects of a shape decision induction task similar
to previous experiments (Kiefer and Martens, 2010) was con-
trasted with a novel color decision task, in which the hue of
colored object picture had to be classified (red vs. blue). In the
visuo-motor priming task, participants performed again right
or left-hand responses to discriminate between geometrical tar-
get shapes (Martens et al., 2011). Occipito-parietal ERP priming
effects were only found subsequent to the shape induction task.
No such effects were found subsequently to the color induc-
tion task. These results show that attentional influences can also
occur within perceptual subdomains, such as shape and color
attributes. Attentional sensitization thus modulates unconscious
visuo-motor processes fine-grained at the level of specific visual
object features.
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Induction task paradigm in combination with a masked
visuo-motor priming task. The masked prime shape was presented either
200ms or 800ms following the response to the induction task (response
prime interval, RPI) that is intended to elicit the corresponding task set. The
RPI was varied in order to capture the temporal dynamics of task set
activation. The semantic induction task required semantic classification
(forced choice living/non-living decision) of the inducing picture, whereas the
perceptual induction task required a forced choice perceptual classification
decision of the pictured object (round/elongated shape). Subsequent to
masked prime presentation, the target shape was presented, which required
a right- or left-hand response. In the congruent priming condition, prime and
target shape afforded the same manual response whereas in the incongruent
condition, prime and target were associated with different response hands.
(B) Behavioral unconscious visuo-motor priming effects of Exp. 2 of the
Martens et al. (2011) study. Mean correct response times and their standard
error in the target shape discrimination task, as a function of response
congruency, induction task, and RPI. The asterisks indicate significant masked
priming effects (difference between incongruent and congruent prime-target
responses) within each induction task/RPI combination. Significant
unconscious visuo-motor priming effects were only obtained following the
perceptual induction task, but not following the semantic induction task.
Modified after Kiefer and Martens (2010) and after Martens et al. (2011).
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UNCONSCIOUS SEMANTIC PROCESSING
Semantic processing of conceptual information provides the
basis for thought, problem solving and action planning (for
recent overviews see, Kiefer and Pulvermüller, 2011; Kiefer and
Barsalou, 2012) and is also crucial for language and commu-
nication because it constitutes word meaning (Levelt et al.,
1999). Semantic processing is, therefore, typically characterized
as a higher-level cognitive process compared with more lower-
level perceptually based visuo-motor processes (Engelkamp
and Zimmer, 1994; Anderson, 2000). Nevertheless, there are
meanwhile numerous demonstrations that semantic meaning
is also processed unconsciously (e.g., Marcel, 1983; Carr and
Dagenbach, 1990; Draine and Greenwald, 1998; Dell’ Acqua and
Grainger, 1999; Kiefer and Spitzer, 2000; Rolke et al., 2001; Kiefer,
2002; e.g., Kiefer and Brendel, 2006). Unconscious semantic pro-
cessing can be demonstrated with the masked semantic priming
paradigm. Semantic priming generally refers to a facilitation of
a response to a meaningful target (e.g., word or picture), when
it is preceded by a semantically related masked prime (Neely,
1977, 1991). For instance, lexical (word/pseudoword) decisions
on word targets are faster, when they are preceded by a seman-
tically related prime word (e.g., “chair-table”) compared with
unrelated pairings (e.g., “car-hen”). In contrast to visuo-motor
priming, primes in the semantically related and unrelated con-
ditions always afford the same response in the target task (word
response in the lexical decision task) thereby ruling out any
response congruency effects. In masked semantic priming, a pat-
tern mask prevents conscious identification of the prime word.
Nevertheless, responses to targets that have been preceded by
a semantically related prime are performed more quickly than
responses to targets paired with unrelated primes demonstrat-
ing unconscious access to word meaning (Carr and Dagenbach,
1990; Kiefer and Spitzer, 2000; Kiefer, 2002; Kiefer and Brendel,
2006). Neuroimaging (Mummery et al., 1999) and electrophysi-
ological studies (Nobre and McCarthy, 1995; Kiefer et al., 2007)
show that semantic priming depends on anterior temporal areas
(ventral pathways) supporting semantic integration (Kiefer and
Pulvermüller, 2011). Semantic priming modulates the N400
ERP component, a negative deflection peaking at about 400ms
with centro-parietal topography (Kutas and Hillyard, 1980). The
N400 semantic priming effect is reflected by an attenuated N400
amplitude (i.e., relatively less negative voltage) to a target when
preceded by a semantically related as compared with an unrelated
prime (Bentin et al., 1985; Kiefer et al., 1998). Intracranial ERP
recordings (Nobre and McCarthy, 1995) and source analyses of
scalp potentials (Kiefer et al., 2007) have implicated a region in
the anterior-ventral temporal lobe in generating the N400 ERP
component.
There is meanwhile accumulating evidence that similar to
visuo-motor priming unconscious semantic priming is modu-
lated by executive control factors (for a recent review, see Kiefer
et al., 2012). In fact most of the empirical tests of the attentional
sensitization model of unconscious cognition with the induction
task paradigm described above have been conducted within the
field of unconscious semantic processing.
Similar to conscious semantic priming (for a review see,
Deacon and Shelley-Tremblay, 2000), unconscious semantic
priming has been shown to depend on attentional resources: in
a masked semantic priming study within a lexical decision task
(word/non-word decision) (Kiefer and Brendel, 2006), an atten-
tional cue prompted participants to attend to the stimulation
stream either during the time window of masked prime pre-
sentation or already one second earlier. In the latter long cue
prime interval condition, subjects already had disengaged atten-
tion when the masked prime was finally presented. Kiefer and
Brendel (2006) obtained a subliminal semantic priming effect on
the N400 ERP component, but only when the masked prime was
presented within the time window of attention. Hence, compa-
rable to the findings in visuo-motor priming (Naccache et al.,
2002), subliminal semantic priming depends on temporal atten-
tion. Furthermore, masked semantic priming was significantly
reduced when the masked prime was preceded by a difficult pri-
mary task requiring greater attentional resources compared with
an attentionally undemanding task (Martens and Kiefer, 2009).
These influences of attentional capacity on unconscious seman-
tic processing are in line with our proposal (Kiefer and Martens,
2010) that attention and conscious experience are functionally
independent to some extent and should not be equated (see also,
Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007; see also, Van Boxtel et al., 2010).
Using the induction task paradigm already described above, we
systematically investigated the influence of activated task sets on
subsequent masked semantic priming (Kiefer and Martens, 2010;
Martens et al., 2011). It was assessed whether a semantic task set
induced by a semantic decision task (e.g., living/non-living deci-
sion) immediately before masked prime presentation sensitizes
semantic processing pathways and enhances subliminal semantic
priming (see Figure 2A). In contrast, a perceptual task set induced
by a task that requires attention to visual stimulus features (letter
or object shape decision) should desensitize semantic pathways
and therefore, attenuate subsequent subliminal semantic priming.
The time interval between the response to the induction task and
the onset of the prime (RPI) (either 200 or 800ms) was varied in
order to obtain information on how the influence of the induc-
tion task on masked priming unfolds over time. We expected that
a semantic induction task sensitizes semantic processing path-
ways and thus enhances semantic priming only at the short RPI
(200ms) because the task switching literature suggests that a task
representation is active for about 600ms after task completion
(Rogers and Monsell, 1995), but is actively inhibited thereafter
(Mayr and Keele, 2000).
Across experiments, the difficulty of the semantic and percep-
tual induction tasks as well as their verbal or non-verbal nature
was systematically varied. For instance, in one experiment (Kiefer
and Martens, 2010), participants performed an easy semantic
word classification task (living/non-living decision) and a diffi-
cult perceptual letter classification task with words (first or last
letter of a word has a closed or open shape). In other experiments
(Kiefer and Martens, 2010; Martens et al., 2011), non-verbal
induction tasks, which exhibited the same level of difficulty,
required semantic classification (living/non-living decision) vs.
perceptual classification (round vs. elongated shape decision) of
object pictures (see Figure 2A).
Comparable results were obtained regardless of the difficulty
level and the verbal or non-verbal nature of the induction tasks
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Induction task paradigm in combination with a masked
semantic priming task. The masked prime word was presented either 200ms
or 800ms following the response to the induction task (RPI). The semantic
induction task required semantic classification (living/non-living decision) of
the pictured object, whereas the perceptual induction task required a
perceptual classification of the object (round/elongated shape). Subsequent
to masked prime presentation, the target word was presented, which
required a lexical decision (word/pseudoword). In the related priming
condition, prime and target were semantically related (“table-chair”) whereas
in the unrelated condition, prime and target were semantically unrelated
(“hen-car”). (B) Behavioral semantic priming effects of Exp. 1 of the Martens
et al. (2011) study. Mean correct response times and their standard error in
the lexical decision task, as a function of semantic relatedness, induction
task, and RPI. The asterisks indicate significant masked priming effects
(difference between semantically unrelated and related conditions) within
each induction task/RPI combination. At the short RPI when the task sets
were active, significant unconscious semantic priming effects were only
obtained following the semantic induction task, but not following the
perceptual induction task. At the long RPI when the task sets were inhibited,
the opposite pattern was observed: unconscious semantic priming effects
were only obtained following the perceptual induction task Modified after
Kiefer and Martens (2010) and after Martens et al. (2011).
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(see Figure 2B for one example). At the short RPI, behavioral
and electrophysiological semantic priming effects were obtained
when a semantic task set was induced immediately before sublim-
inal prime presentation, whereas a previously induced perceptual
task set attenuated priming. In line with the attentional sensiti-
zation model, unconscious semantic processing is enhanced by
a semantic and attenuated by a perceptual task set. At the long
RPI, significant priming was found after the perceptual induc-
tion task, but not after the semantic task. This pattern of priming
effects at the long RPI suggests that after 800ms the task set of
the induction task had been abandoned and a reconfiguration of
the cognitive system in preparation for the upcoming lexical task
had taken place (Kiefer and Martens, 2010): semantic pathways
are sensitized when the perceptual induction task has been aban-
doned, but they are desensitized when the semantic induction
task has been abandoned. This resulting pattern is compatible
with the notion of a backward inhibition mechanism that sup-
presses irrelevant task sets in preparation of the next task (Mayr
and Keele, 2000; Houghton et al., 2009). In line with this inter-
pretation, the RPI did not modulate induction task influences on
subliminal semantic priming when the task set of the induction
task had to bemaintained until the response to the lexical decision
task was given (Kiefer, unpublished data). The differential modu-
latory effects of induction tasks on masked priming as a function
of the RPI provide insight in the dynamic nature of cognitive
reorganization during task set switching that in turn influences
unconscious information processing.
A further recent study using the induction task paradigm
examined the attentional boundary conditions for unconscious
semantic priming to occur (Adams and Kiefer, submitted). It was
assessed whether phonological task sets that are non-semantic in
their nature, but do require some form of linguistic processing
also reduce unconscious semantic priming. In particular, we were
interested whether the effects of phonological induction tasks on
subsequent semantic priming were comparable whether the focus
was set on phonological processing of the entire word vs. single
letters. Before the subliminally primed lexical decision task was
presented, participants performed semantic and phonological
induction tasks that should either activate a semantic or a phono-
logical task set. Across two experiments, the nature of the phono-
logical induction task (word phonology vs. letter phonology) was
varied to assess whether the attentional focus on the entire word
vs. single letters modulates subsequent masked semantic prim-
ing. In both experiments, subliminal semantic priming was only
found subsequent to the semantic induction task, but was abol-
ished following either phonological induction task. The results of
this study indicate that attention to phonology attenuates sub-
sequent semantic processing of unconsciously presented primes
whether or not attention is directed to the entire word or to
single letters. In line with the attentional sensitization model,
these findings substantiate the notion that an attentional orien-
tation toward semantics is necessary for unconscious semantic
processing to be elicited.
This research on attentional influences on subliminal semantic
priming helps to reconcile previous discrepant evidence regard-
ing the automaticity of semantic processing. It has been argued
that semantic processing is not automatic, but requires controlled
access to conceptual meaning (Henik et al., 1994; Duscherer and
Holender, 2002) because semantic priming with visible stimuli
has been found to depend on the attentional orientation toward
the prime word (for a review, see Maxfield, 1997; for a review,
see Deacon and Shelley-Tremblay, 2000): earlier studies on the
effects of prime tasks observed reduced or absent semantic prim-
ing when participants were required to attend to perceptual letter
features of the prime (e.g., a letter search task) and not to its
meaning (e.g., Chiappe et al., 1996; Mari-Beffa et al., 2005).
These findings were taken as evidence that access to conceptual
meaning is confined to a controlled processing mode. However,
several other studies demonstrating that unconsciously perceived
prime words can elicit semantic priming effects favor the view
that semantic processing can also occur in an automatic fashion
(Carr and Dagenbach, 1990; Draine and Greenwald, 1998; Kiefer
and Spitzer, 2000; Rolke et al., 2001; Kiefer, 2002). This apparent
contradiction can be easily resolved if one assumes that uncon-
scious automatic processes depend on executive control through
attentional sensitization (Kiefer and Martens, 2010). Our work
using the induction task paradigm in combination with a sublim-
inally primed lexical decision task (e.g., Kiefer andMartens, 2010;
Martens et al., 2011) shows that even under purely automatic pro-
cessing conditions, semantic priming is susceptible to executive
control as predicted by our attentional sensitization model.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Accumulating evidence demonstrates that various forms of
unconscious processing are susceptible to executive control simi-
lar to conscious processing: subliminal visuo-motor, and seman-
tic priming effects, prototypical examples of automatic processes,
are modulated by executive control factors such as attentional
resources, stimulus expectations, action intentions, and task
sets. These top-down factors are typically considered to involve
executive control mechanisms dedicated to organize action and
thought (Norman and Shallice, 1986; Posner and DiGirolamo,
1998). Hence, in contrast to classical theories of automatic-
ity and executive control (Posner and Snyder, 1975; Schneider
and Shiffrin, 1977), automatic processes elicited by unconscious
visual stimuli are under executive control to some extent. The
findings reviewed here support refined theories of automaticity
(Neumann, 1990; Naccache et al., 2002; Moors and De Houwer,
2006) in general and the attentional sensitizationmodel of uncon-
scious information processing in particular (Kiefer, 2007; Kiefer
and Martens, 2010). According to the attentional sensitization
model (Kiefer and Martens, 2010), processing can occur auto-
matically in the sense that it does not depend on conscious
awareness and that it is initiated without deliberate intention.
However, unconscious automatic processing is modulated by
executive control and depends on an appropriate configuration
of the cognitive system. Thus, within the light of the atten-
tional sensitization model and the data reviewed in this article,
unconscious automatic processing and the notion of executive
control are compatible. As shown above, the assumption of atten-
tional sensitization of unconscious information processing can
accommodate conflicting findings regarding the automaticity of
processes inmany areas of psychology and the neurosciences such
as visuo-motor (Bub andMasson, 2010), and semantic processing
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(Rees et al., 1999; Kiefer and Martens, 2010). The attentional
sensitization mechanism may thus apply to many domains and
has the explanatory power to account for seemingly contradic-
tory empirical phenomena. Evidence for executive control over
unconscious visuo-motor and semantic processing described in
the previous sections concerned neuro-cognitive functions pre-
dominantly processed in cortical structures. However, if atten-
tional sensitization of unconscious information processing is a
general principle, it should also apply to emotional processes,
which depend at least in part on subcortical structures (LeDoux,
1996; Rolls, 1999).
IS UNCONSCIOUS EMOTIONAL PROCESSING MODULATED BY
EXECUTIVE CONTROL?
Unconscious emotional processes can be investigated with the
masked affective priming paradigm. In affective priming, which
is assumed to depend on activation of emotional representations,
primes and targets (words or pictures) share the same or different
(positive, e.g., baby vs. negative, e.g., shark) emotional valence
(Fazio et al., 1986; Fazio, 2001). For instance, in an evaluative
judgment task (pleasant vs. unpleasant) on visible target stimuli,
responses are typically faster when primes and targets exhibit the
same emotional valence (for review, see Fazio, 2001). Affective
priming activated emotional brain areas including the amyg-
dala, insula, and orbitofrontal cortex (Liu et al., 2010). Although
visuo-motor response conflict certainly plays a role for emotional
priming during evaluative judgments (Klauer et al., 1997; Klinger
et al., 2000), the use of tasks with response-categories that dif-
fer from prime-target relatedness demonstrated the involvement
of emotional processes in addition to response-based processes
(Spruyt et al., 2007;Wentura and Frings, 2008). It should be noted
that in most of these experiments stimuli were presented visibly.
Nevertheless, these findings are suggestive for executive control
influences on unconscious emotional processing as it is shown
below.
In the literature on affective priming, there has been a long-
standing debate whether emotional information is automatically
processed. This debate has been fueled by the observation that
affective priming with visible (e.g., Klauer and Musch, 2001;
Spruyt et al., 2004) or subliminal primes (Eckstein and Perrig,
2007) frequently disappeared when target tasks other than eval-
uative judgments (e.g., semantic categorization or word pronun-
ciation) were used. For instance, affective congruency (positive
vs. negative valence) of subliminally presented masked prime
words elicited only priming effects on the subsequent target
decision during an evaluative judgment task, but not during a
non-emotional semantic (living/non-living) judgment (Eckstein
and Perrig, 2007). Unconscious automatic emotional processing
has, therefore, been considered to be a spurious phenomenon (for
a discussion, Klinger et al., 2000; for a discussion, Klauer and
Musch, 2003). This conclusion is premature, however, because
within the light of the attentional sensitization model (Kiefer and
Martens, 2010) even unconscious automatic emotional process-
ing depends on an attentional amplification of corresponding
processing pathways. When the target task requires attention
to non-emotional semantic stimulus features (e.g., living/non-
living decision), emotional pathways are desensitized resulting
in decreased or absent emotional priming. Hence, for emotional
priming to occur, attention must be directed to the emotional
stimulus dimension in order to sensitize emotional processing
pathways (Spruyt et al., 2009, 2012).
Spruyt and colleagues (Spruyt et al., 2009, 2012) tested the
proposed attentional modulation of emotional processing in two
studies. In all experiments, emotional priming was probed dur-
ing a word pronunciation task, which did not explicitly require
emotional processing. With such a pronunciation task most pre-
vious studies failed to find emotional priming effects (for a review
see, Klauer and Musch, 2003). Most critically, in the experiments
by Spruyt and colleagues attention was directed to emotional
or non-emotional semantic word features in separate participant
groups by interspersing different types of induction trials between
the priming trials requiring word pronunciation: these induc-
tion trials required an emotional or a non-emotional semantic
categorization of words and should differentially allocate atten-
tion to emotional vs. non-emotional semantic features. Based
on the assumption that automatic emotional processing requires
an attentional sensitization of emotional pathways, emotional
priming during a pronunciation task should only be obtained
within the context of emotional induction trials, but not within
the context of non-emotional semantic induction trials. Results
clearly confirmed these predictions: whether primes were pre-
sented unmasked and visibly (Spruyt et al., 2009) or masked and
unconsciously (Spruyt et al., 2012), affective congruency between
primes and targets facilitated target pronunciation only in the
blocks with the emotional induction trials. These findings provide
supporting evidence for an attentional modulation of uncon-
scious emotional processing and help to reconcile discrepant
findings regarding the automaticity of emotional priming: emo-
tional priming whether elicited by conscious or unconscious
stimuli, crucially requires a sensitization of emotional pathways.
Thus, attentional sensitization of unconscious processing may
apply to emotional brain circuits, which partially involve subcor-
tical structures (LeDoux, 1996; Rolls, 1999), and is not restricted
to predominant cortical processes such as visuo-motor or seman-
tic processing. However, as data regarding attentional modulation
of unconscious emotional processing are scarce, this research area
certainly deserves further investigation.
FLEXIBILITY OF UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSING IN HEALTHY AND
CLINICAL POPULATIONS
Our general experimental approach that combines a first task for
inducing task sets with a subsequent (subliminally) primed deci-
sion task is a useful tool for addressing many research questions
regarding executive control of unconscious information process-
ing. It can be used to test whether other forms of unconscious
processes than presently investigated in detail (e.g., emotional,
visuo-spatial, motor, phonological, orthographic) are similarly
susceptible to executive control. It would also be interesting to
investigate whether attentional sensitization applies to implicit
memory (Schacter, 1995) or implicit learning (Curran, 1998).
This would demonstrate that attentional sensitization of uncon-
scious information processing is a general mechanism imple-
mented in the human neuro-cognitive system. The notion of
attentional sensitization of unconscious information processing
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could also help to explain and to further empirically investi-
gate cognitive impairments in clinical populations who occa-
sionally show deficits in unconscious information processing
(Kiefer et al., 2009). In particular, conscious control of uncon-
scious emotional processing is clinically highly important because
findings in this area might help to design more efficient ther-
apeutic treatment techniques for mood and anxiety disorders.
The present approach could also help to elucidate why puta-
tively automatic cognitive processes are strongly modulated by
hypnotic induction. For instance, the Stroop interference effect
(Stroop, 1935) that depends on a conflict between task-irrelevant
automatic processes of word reading and task-relevant processes
of color naming (Cohen et al., 1990) is abolished when partici-
pants receive the hypnotic suggestion that (English) color words
should be conceived as meaningless character strings written in
an unknown alphabet (Raz et al., 2006, 2007). Hence, our frame-
work could contribute to a better understanding of the attentional
mechanisms underlying the effects of hypnosis in research and
therapeutic settings.
Although much progress has been made to demonstrate exec-
utive control influences on unconscious information process-
ing using behavioral or neurophysiological measures, its precise
functional-anatomical architecture has to be better character-
ized: the attentional sensitization model assumes that control of
unconscious processes is exerted by a prefrontal top-down signal,
which influences the sensitivity in brain circuits that process spe-
cific information such as stimulus dimensions or features. This
assumption can be tested in more detail by means of fMRI and
electrophysiological recording techniques.
In conclusion, the executive control influences of uncon-
scious processing reviewed here demonstrates the adaptability of
the cognitive system in optimizing ongoing processing toward
the pursuit of an intended goal. This research suggests that
preemptive executive control of unconscious processes as pos-
tulated by the attentional sensitization model coordinates even
the unconscious processing streams in congruency with higher-
level task representations. This considerably reduces the effort of
the cognitive control system to organize behavior because task-
incongruent processes are dampened at relatively early stages.
Hence, attentional sensitization of unconscious information pro-
cessing contributes to an effective goal-related adaptation of our
cognitive system.
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